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Abstract
The increasing use of Electronic Health Records has been mirrored by a similar rise in the number
of security incidents where confidential information has inadvertently been disclosed to third parties.
These problems have been compounded by an apparent inability to learn from previous violations;
similar security incidents have been observed across Europe, North America and Asia. This has
resulted in the loss of confidence and trust of the public towards the organisations’ ability to protect
the patients’ private information. The Generic Security Template (G.S.T.) has been proposed to
communicate security lessons learned from previous security incidents. This paper conducts a series
of empirical studies to evaluate the usability of the G.S.T. The first study compares the G.S.T. with
the conventional text-based security incident reports. The two methods were compared in term of
the users’ ability to identify a number of lessons learned from investigations into previous incidents
involving the disclosure of healthcare records. The study showed that the graphical approach resulted
in higher accuracy in terms of number of correct answers generated by participants. However,
subjective feedback raised further questions about the usability of the G.S.T. as the readers of security
incident reports try to interpret the lessons that can increase the security of patient data. The second
study further evaluates the usability of the G.S.T. using the Cognitive Dimensions and identifies some
aspects that need to be improved.
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Introduction
According to Symantec, the healthcare accounted for 36% in the total number of attacks on electronic
information systems in 2013 [1]. At 44% in 2014, healthcare continues to be the sector responsible for
the largest percentage of disclosed data incidents by industry [2]. Almost identical breaches have
occurred across Europe, North America and Asia [3]. Such incidents may affect the organisations’
reputation and challenge the public confidence and trust toward organisations’ information security
management [4]. It is imperative for the organisations to learn from those incidents and take effective
actions to improve the reliability and trustworthiness of their information security management
systems. Learning from incidents enables the organisation to extract meaningful information from
incidents, and use this information to improve security management systems [5]. Effective
communication mechanism is needed to synthesis the information from the incident into the security
incident management system so as to prevent a similar incident.
Popular communication mechanisms include formal reports, less formal meetings, newsletters, emails,
as well as presentations to management [5]. However, the detailed incident reports that are produced in
the post-incident activity [6] have not been given enough attention. Those reports contain
comprehensive information, which is typically classified into two types, business impact and
remediation information [6]. Business impact information involves how the incident is affecting the
organisation in terms of mission impact, financial impact, etc. For example, “The missing external hard
drive is believed to contain numerous research-related files containing personally identifiable
information and/or individually identifiable health information for over 250,000 veterans, and
information obtained from the Centres for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS), on over 1.3 million medical providers” [7]. Remediation
information mainly refers to the suggested remediation actions, plans, procedures, and lessons learned.
For example, “We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for Information and Technology revise VA
Directive 6601 to require the use of encryption, or an otherwise effective tool, to properly protect
personally identifiable information and other sensitive data stored on removable storage devices when
used within VA.” [7].
As for a purpose of sharing, it is suggested to avoid sharing business impact information with outside
organisations unless there is a clear value proposition or formal reporting requirements. When sharing
information with peers and partner organisations, incident response teams should focus on exchanging
remediation information [6]. The remediation information reported describes (1) the security issues,
e.g. “The position sensitivity level for the IT Specialist was inaccurately designated as moderate risk,
which was inconsistent with his programmer privileges and resulted in a less extensive background
investigation”, (2) the security objectives violated during this process, e.g. “Position Sensitivity Level
Assessments were Not Adequately Performed”, and (3) the recommendations, e.g.“We recommend that
the Under Secretary for Health direct the Medical Centre Director to re-evaluate and correct position
sensitivity levels and associated background investigations for positions at the Birmingham VAMC ” [7].
Those granular information are inter-related, however, they are scattered documented in a pure textual
based report that makes it difficult for the readers to identify the relationships among them. This issue
has been compounded by the lengthy security incident report, which is usually around hundred of pages
[7]. The stakeholders responsible for protecting patient data lack the time and the motivation to spend
the many hours needed to read and digest existing reports. This creates significant problems within the
wider scope of security management systems. It can be difficult to accurately assess the likelihood or
consequences of future attacks when managers are unaware of previous incidents, which undermines
the trustworthiness of the systems.
Graphical techniques can address some of these limitations. The Generic Security Template (G.S.T.) has
been developed [3,8] to help readers understand the lessons learned from previous security incidents. In
particular, it extends the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) [9] to provide an overview of previous data
breaches. The intention is to map out the security objectives, security issues and recommendations that
are embedded in the many pages of text that are used in conventional reports. More information on the
GSN and the G.S.T. is provided in section ‘The generic security template’. Figure 1 provides an excerpt
from one of these diagrams. It is based on a report into the disclosure of personal information about
250,000 veterans and over 1.3 million medical providers by the US Veterans Affairs Administration
(VA) [7]. This incident report provides the case study that is used throughout this paper. The leaf nodes
in this diagram are used to gather together the recommendations that were intended to avoid future
incidents. The internal nodes are used to show how each of these findings supports higher level goals
and sub-goals intended to ensure that systems meet an acceptable level of security, defined in terms
of the US Government’s Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual (FISCAM) [10]. Further
information about the graphical technique is provided in [3,8,11]. The use of graphical overviews is
intended to make it easier to identify recommendations that can be transferred from a previous incident
to prevent similar breaches from occurring in other organisations.
Figure 1 Generic Security Template - VA dataloss 2007.
Previous work has shown that the G.S.T. can be used to map common lessons from data breaches in
healthcare organisations in both the United States and in China [3]. Although these incidents occurred
in very different contexts, the security concerns and the consequences for patient confidentiality show
remarkable similarities. Previous work provided initial case studies but did not, present empirical
support to evaluate the usability of the G.S.T.
This paper, therefore, presents a series of empirical studies to evaluate the G.S.T. The remainder of
the paper is structured as the following, section ‘Related work’ reviews the related work, section ‘The
generic security template’ briefly introduces the Generic Security Template, section ‘Empirical study -
compare G.S.T. with text-based approach’ presents the first empirical study, section ‘Extended study -
evaluation using cognitive dimensions’ presents the second study, and section ‘Conclusions and future
work’ summarises the paper.
Related work
Trust management
There are a variety of definitions of trust [12]. Two common definitions are reliability trust [13] and
decision trust [12]. In this paper, we refer to the reliability trust that is defined as the users’ subjective
expectation about a service provider to perform a given action on which its welfare depends [13,14].
The public expects the healthcare organisation to securely protect their medical record while processing
this information for different purposes such as medical diagnosis and researches. However, the repeats
of the security incidents have undermined the public’s trust in the healthcare organisations information
security management systems. There is a need for the organisations to learn the lessons from the security
incidents and demonstrate to the public that those incidents have been treated seriously and are under
control.
Sharing of security lessons
NIST [15,16] and SANS [17,18] have stressed the importance to share security lessons. They require that
the insights from previous security breaches are documented, reviewed, presented and integrated back
into the incident response process for future improvement. A growing number of regulatory agencies
now provide detailed reports that are intended to help avoid any recurrence of previous failures. Security
management systems have also been introduced into many healthcare organisations to ensure previous
security incidents inform threat and risk assessments [19]. Improving situation awareness, in particular
about security breaches, help persuade end users of the importance of existing policies and procedures.
There are further benefits from the wider dissemination of incident reports. Security engineers can learn
important lessons about the analysis, containment, eradication, and recovery from previous attacks [16].
Evaluation of graphical notations
The introduction has argued that existing, text-based reports can be supported through the use of
graphical notations that provide an overview of many dozens of pages of detailed prose. It is also
hoped that this use of a semi-formal notation will encourage greater consistency and
correctness [20,21]. Although graphical representations are often perceived as easier to understand, it
can be difficult for readers to interpret the meaning of abstract symbols [22,23]. The notation
introduces unfamiliar syntax and semantics. There is a danger that our use of these techniques can
prevent stakeholders from understanding the arguments in security incident reports [24-26]. This paper,
therefore, presents a series of empirical studies to evaluate the usability of graphical representations of
security incident reports.
The generic security template
As mentioned, the G.S.T. extends the Goal Structuring Notations (GSN) [9] to provide an overview of
previous security breaches. GSN is the dominant approach in the UK defence sector, increasingly being
used in safety-critical industries to improve the structure, rigor, and clarity of design requirements. A
particular strength is that it also links the evidence to show that particular requirements have been met.
The same approach has more recently been extended to document security requirements [3,8]. There
are four principal notations used in the GSN, A Goal is a claim, the statements that the goal structure is
designed to support. Evidence exists to support the truth of the claimed goal, which can be documented
by providing a solution in GSN. Strategy is inserted between goals at two levels of abstraction, to
explain how the top-level goal is addressed by the aggregation of the goals presented at the lower level.
Context is used to declare supplementary information and provide adequate understanding of the context
surrounding the claim (or strategy). Usually it presents concepts clarification introduced in the claim (or
strategy) [9].
The G.S.T. has customised the GSN. Instead of collecting evidence to support design and development
requirements, it collects lessons (i.e. security causes and recommendations) from previous security
incidents. These lessons are defined as the knowledge or understanding gained by experience [27]. In
the G.S.T., they refer to the security issues that cause a security breach, and the security
recommendations intended to avoid any recurrence. The evidence of compliance with the security
objectives is presented in the form of a specific security standard or guideline applied to the
organisation where the security incident happened. This has reflected the granular information
described in section ‘Introduction’. Generic, is defined as “characteristic of or relating to a class or
group of things; not specific”. In other words, the intention is to create a GSN diagram that conveys the
lessons learned from specific previous security breaches at a level of abstraction that helps others to use
them to improve the security of other systems.
Figure 2 presents the notations used in the Generic Security Template. In particular, rather than using
the evidence derived from validation and verification to support safety arguments, the G.S.T. uses the
findings from previous data breach incidents (i.e. leaf nodes of Figure 1) to support security arguments
in terms of the compliance with the security guideline (i.e. internal nodes of Figure 1). The other
concepts remain the same between both application areas.
Figure 2 Customised GSN Notations.
Empirical study - compare G.S.T. with text-based approach
Experiment objective and scope
A controlled experiment was conducted to evaluate whether the use of graphical techniques helps
improve the comprehension of the lessons from previous security incident reports compared to
conventional text-based approaches. The aim was not to show that graphical techniques could replace
conventional reports; in contrast the focus was in the use of the G.S.T. to provide a map or overview of
complex text-based reports. Purely graphical representations are often less expressive than textual
representation as some system properties cannot easily be specified using diagrams alone. A combined
graphical representation with supporting textual representations can assist visualisation while still
achieving the full expressiveness and precision of a textual representation [23]. Accuracy, efficiency
and task load are compared quantitatively in this experiment and the following hypotheses are
proposed for the comparison.
H1: Participants will be better able to identify the Lessons learned (security issues, security
recommendations) in security incident report with the help of the G.S.T. than using Text-based
Document alone;
H2: Participants will be better able to identify the compliance with the security objectives in security
incident report with the help of the G.S.T. than using Text-based Document alone;
H3: The time taken to complete the designed task will be less using the G.S.T. than that using the
text-based Document alone;
H4: The task load will be lower using the G.S.T. than using the text-based Document alone.
Ease of use is compared qualitatively based on the feedback obtained from participants.
Experiment variables
Dependent variables
We evaluate the usability [28] in terms of the accuracy, efficiency, ease-of-use and task load compared
to the conventional, text-based approach. Accuracy, is measured by assessing the quality of the security
causes, recommendations and the compliance with the security objectives from the security incident.
Efficiency, is measured by the time it takes to complete the experiment task. Ease of use, is evaluated by
the feedback obtained from the post-experiment questionnaire. Task load, is measured by the application
of NASA’s Task Load Index to assess workload [29].
Independent variables
Generic Security Template (G.S.T.), we used the same G.S.T. across all participants. This presents
findings from the US Veteran’s Affairs administration 2007 Dataloss Incident [7]. Text-based approach,
we developed an executive summary (reduced to four pages) and a simplified security guideline (reduced
to three pages) from the FISCAM. More details on the experiment material preparation are provided in
4.3.
Controlled variables
Participants, the participants were post-graduate and undergraduate students with different education
background. Tasks, the experiment itself lasted for maximum one hour. Participants had to identify
causes, recommendations and the relationships with security objectives using either a conventional text-
based document or using the graphical overview plus the existing report.
Extraneous variable
Experience with GSN, is defined as an extraneous variable in this experiment. People who have
experience with GSN will have an obvious advantage in comprehending the security incident with the
help of the G.S.T. People who have experience with GSN were excluded from this experiment.
Experiment materials
Security incident report
Security Incident Report. The technical context of the task focused on a data loss incident involving
the Veterans Affairs’ Administration [7]. The original report was around 80 pages long and hence we
could not use it directly within the time available for the experiment. We also felt that our more focused
approach was more appropriate for an initial study that could, in turn, inform future empirical work over
a longer period of time and with a larger number of participants. We, therefore, provided both groups
with the executive summary from the VA report reduced to four pages. As is mentioned, the evidence
of compliance with the security objectives is presented in the form of a specific security standard or
guideline applied to the organisation where the security incident happened. Therefore, a simplified
version of security guidelines (reduced to three pages) cited from the FISCAM that are relevant to this
incident are also provided as a part of the security incident report.
The G.S.T
The G.S.T. used in this experiment is created from the above mentioned security incident report only. It
is an abstraction and extraction of the desirable information and did not bring any other information that
can bias the results of the experiment.
The questionnaire
We developed separate tasks description for the two groups and a post-experiment questionnaire, to
provide subjective insights into perceived workload. A slightly different version of this
post-experiment questionnaire was developed for the group using the graphical overview of the
security incident. They were asked to provide information about the usability of the approach by
completing subjective questionnaire.
The pilot study
Two security experts reviewed the design of the experiment pilot studies then helped to identify issues
that had not been identified during the preparation of the materials. For example, they helped adjusting
the complexity of the case study and suggested to reduce the incident report to four pages as mentioned
in 4.3.1. In the first pilot study, participants had to identify security issues, recommendations and
compliance with the security objectives; writing them down using freestyle text. This was to simulate
how security incident reports are analysed in practice, where people normally have no tools assisting
them throughout this process. The feedback from the participants showed that the task was very
mentally demanding and they were not able to complete it within one hour. We corrected this problem
by introducing a table that provided guidance on the security issues and recommendations. The
participants are required to fill in the blanks cells in the table. For the measurement of compliance with
the security objectives, we have used multi-choice questions as the measurement mainly focuses on the
relationships between the security objectives and the recommendations for prevention. Two more
participants conducted a pilot test of the new experiment design. They were able to finish the tasks and
stated that the level of mental effort was acceptable.
Experiment task design
In Group A, the experiment materials included the textual incident report (reduced executive summary
and reduced security guidelines from FISCAM), the graphical G.S.T. and a task description. The pilot
study had confirmed the arguments presented in the opening sections of this paper; that it can be difficult
for readers to identify the causes, recommendation and the compliance with the security objectives of
previous security incidents from existing textual reports. We, therefore, created tasks that guided the
participants’ analysis:
Task 1: Identify security issues and recommendations from the security incident report with the help of
the G.S.T. They had to complete missing information from a table that provided partial information about
the causes and recommendations. Table 1 is an exempt of the table. Issue Category and Description are
provided. The participants need to fill in the blank about the recommendation description.
Table 1 An exempt of the security issue and recommendation table
Issue Category Issue description Recommendations
description
Access Control
Related
The IT Specialist was
improperly given access
to multiple data sources.
Task 2: Answer multiple-choice questions on compliance of the security objectives. This removed
the additional contextual support of the tabular format used in task one and provided a stepping stone
towards the open ended analysis of security incident reports that proved problematic in the pilot studies.
In Group B, the experiment materials included the textual incident report without the G.S.T. but
participants had the same task descriptions as the first group.
Experiment procedures
Experiment treatment
There was only one treatment in the experiment using a between groups (Group A and B) design. The
empirical comparisons are between one group using a conventional text-based document and the other
using the graphical overview as well as the existing report.
Participants
To conduct research involving human participants, this experiment adhered to the BPS ethical
guidelines, and has been approved by the ethics committee of the Glasgow University (ref:
CSE01098). Information sheets were disseminated to each school of the redacted university. This has
provided suitable coverage of participants from different background across the university. The
participants attended this study voluntarily. The participants completed the consent form before
starting the study. Twenty-four subjects were recruted and assigned to either of the two experimental
conditions - using the textual report only or using both the textual report and the graphical overview.
Group A consists of one undergraduate student and eleven postgraduate students, within which three of
them have information security experience; Group B has one undergraduate student and eleven
postgraduate students, within which three of them have information security experience. Each of the
group has three females and nine males. None of them have experience with GSN or G.S.T.
The use of the students is justified for pragmatic and also for ethical reasons. Interviews with
healthcare and IT professionals in healthcare organisations revealed that many lack formal training in
security incident reporting and analysis; they come from varied backgrounds [8]. The growing number
of patient data breaches has also created enormous sensitivity; many employers are extremely
unwilling to participate in studies of this nature even when anonymity is guaranteed [8].
Training of the participants
A pre-scripted familiarisation tutorial was provided before the experiment. Participants from both Group
A and B attended the same tutorial session. This was to ensure that they received equal knowledge
related to the handling of security incidents. The participants were introduced to the Goal Structuring
Notations and G.S.T.
Experiment execution
The experiment was conducted on a one-to-one mode to provide any support needed during the whole
process including the familiarization tutorial session, the experiment session and the post-experiment
questionnaire session. During the familiarisation tutorial session, the participant had unlimited time
to study the material and to have any question clarified. The participants were allowed to refer to the
tutorial document or notes. The participants were instructed to inform the experiment conductor if they
had any trouble in understanding the questions. During the post-experiment questionnaire session, an
informal interview was conducted to make sure their attitudes were consistent with the answers they
have provided. They are also requested to write down their subjective feedback on the G.S.T.
Results - prepare the data
Scoring scheme for the experiment tasks
Sample answers for the experimental tasks were agreed on by two independent security experts.
Preparation for Task 1 - open-ended questions
For Task 1, the answers expected were qualitative. The marking was based on the description of
security issues and recommendations expected from the sample answers. The answers for each task
were marked by two further independent experts (Rater A and B) using an agreed scoring scheme. The
participants’ answers were classified into four categories, which are “Correct”, “Incomplete”,
“Wrong” and “Blank”. A correct answer completely described the recommendation to support the
given issue; incomplete answers show that the participant had a partial understanding of the
recommendation, but lacked comprehension of an important aspect of it. Wrong answers showed that
the participant did not understand a particular recommendation. Blank, no answer was provided at all.
The following paragraph provides an example from task one:
The report identifies the security concern: “The IT Specialist was improperly given access to multiple
data sources”. An answer is marked as, Correct, if the participant states that the recommendation
associated with this issue was to “Consider the conditions under which programmer level access may
be granted for research project”. A correct answer completely describes the recommendation to support
the given issue; Incomplete, if the answer is stated as “Ensure the access control is appropriately
granted”. Incomplete answers show that the participant had a partial understanding of the
recommendation, but lacked comprehension of an important aspect of it; Wrong, if the answer provided
is not relevant to a particular recommendation. Blank, if no answer was provided at all.
Each participant was free to use his or her own words to describe the recommendations in this part of the
study. The group identifiers were removed so that Rater A and B marked the answers without knowing
whether or not the participants had access to the G.S.T. diagram.
Preparation for Task 2 - multi-choice questions
Task 2 used multi-choice questions to examine the participant’s ability in understanding the compliance
with the security objectives. Less subjectivity was involved in interpreting the answers. There can be
more than one correct choice for each question and participants were asked to select all of the responses
they believe were relevant to the questions. Below is an example.
What are the security recommendations for addressing the security objective “User Access Control”?
a. Develop and implement policies describing the conditions under which programmer level access
may be granted for research purposes.
b. Effective procedures are implemented to determine compliance with authentication policies.
c. Attempts to log on with invalid passwords are limited. Use of easily guessed passwords (such as
names or words) is prohibited.
d. None of the above
Correct answer: a, b
The sample answers were prepared by the independent security expert A. Each answer was classified
as, Correct, Correct but broad, Incomplete, Incomplete and broad, Wrong, and Blank. A correct answer
contained and only contained all the acceptable choices (e.g. a, b); Correct but broad contained all the
acceptable choices, but also incorrect choices (e.g. a, b, c); Incomplete answers contained only some
of the acceptable choices but not all (e.g. a). Incomplete and broad answers contained some of the
acceptable choices and also other choices. (e.g. a, c); Wrong answers contained none of the acceptable
choices (e.g. c). There was only one blank answer out of 144 responses; therefore we ignore this in the
subsequent analysis.
Results - Analysis
Results for accuracy (Task 1)
Since the results are categorical data, we use cross-tabulation analysis to analyse the results. A data set
with 168 rows was imported into SPSS. Within the cross-tabulation analysis, groups were set as rows
and task results were set as columns. Chi-square statistics was selected to test the hypothesis. Recall
that these open ended questions were assessed by two independent raters. For Rater A, as is shown in
Table 2, the results from the cross-tabulation analysis show that 62.7% of the responses from Group A
were correct, which is 18.8% higher than Group B. This might seem a relatively low level of accuracy.
However, it is important to recall that our marking scheme was careful to distinguish between complete,
perfect responses and partially correct or incomplete answers. The total percentage of incomplete and
correct answer is 81.9% in Group A, which is 16% higher than Group B. As is shown in Table 3, the
Chi-Square Test (P = 0.031 < 0.05) shows that these results are statistically significant. Therefore,
hypothesis H1 “Participants will be better able to identify the recommendations and causes in security
reports with the help of a graphical method than using text alone” is supported based on Rater A’s
judgement.
Table 2 The performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater A
Wrong Incomplete Correct Total
Group A Count 15 16 52 83
within
Group
18.1% 19.3%16 62.7% 100.0%
Group B Count 28 18 36 82
within
Group
34.1% 22.0%16 43.9% 100.0%
Total Count 43 34 88 165
within
Group
26.1% 20.6%16 53.3% 100.0%
Table 3 Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater A
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 6.951a 2 .031
Likelihood Ratio 7.029 2 .030
Linear-by-LinearAssociation 6.909 2 .009
N of Valid Cases 165
For Rater B, as is shown in Table 4, the results from the cross-tabulation analysis show that 65.1% of
the responses from Group A were correct, which is 20% higher than Group B. The total percentage of
Incomplete and Correct answer is 83.1% in Group A, which is 9.6% higher than Group B. As is shown
in Table 5, the Chi-Square Test (P = 0.019 < 0.05) shows that these results are statistically significant.
Therefore, hypothesis H1 “Participants will be better able to identify the recommendations and causes
in security reports with the help of a graphical method than using text alone” is again supported based
on Rater B’s judgement.
Table 4 The performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater B
Wrong Incomplete Correct Total
Group A Count 14 15 54 83
within
Group
16.9% 18.1%16 65.1% 100.0%
Group B Count 28 17 37 82
within
Group
34.1% 20.7%16 45.1% 100.0%
Total Count 42 32 91 165
within
Group
25.5% 19.4%16 55.2% 100.0%
Table 5 Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 1 using Cross-tabulation by Rater B
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 7.962a 2 .019
Likelihood Ratio 8.071 2 .018
Linear-by-LinearAssociation 7.911 1 .005
N of Valid Cases 165
Since these open ended questions were assessed by two independent raters, inter-rater reliability was
checked for each question in Task 1. The results in Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 shows that the two
raters have achieved agreements on judging the accuracy of the lessons learned identified by the
participants and the results are statistically significant (Approx.Sig. < 0.001). Landis and Koch
proposed the benchmark scale on how the extent of agreement among raters should be interpreted and
how the extent of agreement among raters should be interpreted [30], as is shown in Table 13. They
have recommended this as useful guideline and Everitt also supported this benchmark scale [31].
Questions 1 (KappaV alue = 0.706), 3 (KappaV alue = 0.715), 5 (KappaV alue = 0.723), and 6
(KappaV alue = 0.782) have achieved “substantial agreement”. Questions 2 (KappaV alue = 0.801)
have achieved “almost perfect agreement”; Questions 4 (KappaV alue = 0.574) and 7
(KappaV alue = 0.497) has achieved “Moderate agreement”.
Table 6 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 1 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.706 .117 4.254 .000
N of Valid Cases 24
Table 7 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 2 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.801 .105 5.415 .000
N of Valid Cases 23
Table 8 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 3 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.715 .127 4.786 .000
N of Valid Cases 24
Table 9 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 4 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.574 .128 3.962 .000
N of Valid Cases 22
Table 10 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 5 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.723 .120 4.796 .000
N of Valid Cases 24
Table 11 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 6 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.782 .104 5.325 .000
N of Valid Cases 24
Table 12 Inter-rater reliability for Task 1 Question 7 (Rater A and B)
Value Asymp. Std.
Error a
Approx.
Tb
Approx.
Sig.
Measure of Agreement
Kappa
.497 .154 3.251 .001
N of Valid Cases 24
Table 13 Landis and Koch-Kappa’s benchmark scale [30]
Kappa
Statistic
Strength of
Agreement
Less than 0.0 Poor
0.0 to 0.20 Slight
0.21 to 0.40 Fair
0.41 to 0.60 Moderate
0.61 to 0.80 Substantial
0.81 to 1.00 Almost Perfect
The results for accuracy (Task 2)
As is shown in Table 14, the results from the cross-tabulation analysis show that the participants from
Group A achieved a 33.3% accuracy rate, which is 9.7% higher than Group B. The total percentage of
Correct, Broad, Incomplete, and Incomplete but broad answer is 87.5%, which is 18.1% higher than
Group B. As is shown in Table 15, the Chi-Square Test (P = 0.038 < 0.05) shows that these results
are statistically significant. Therefore, hypothesis H2 “Participants will be better able to identify the
security arguments on the supportive relationships between the lessons and the security requirements
with the help of the G.S.T. than using text-based document alone;” is supported in Task 2.
Table 14 The performance of Task 2 using Cross-tabulation
Wrong Incomplete
and
broad
Incomplete Broad Correct Total
Group
A
Count 9 11 19 9 24 83
within
Group
12.5% 15.3% 26.4% 12.5% 33/3% 100.0%
Group
B
Count 22 4 18 11 17 82
within
Group
30.6% 5.6%16 25.0% 15.3% 23.6% 100.0%
Total Count 31 15 37 20 41 165
within
Group
21.5% 10.4%16 25.7% 13.9% 28.5% 100.0%
Table 15 Chi-Square Tests performance of Task 2 using Cross-tabulation
Value df Asymp. Sig.
(2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 10.140a 4 .038
Likelihood Ratio 10.449 4 .034
Linear-by-Linear
Association
2.995 1 .084
N of Valid Cases 144
The results for efficiency (Time)
The mean total time used by Group A was almost equal that in Group B; 47.3 versus 47.8 minutes.
The total time taken across all tasks is not statistically significant (P = 0.932 > 0.05). Therefore,
we can accept the null hypothesis that “the mean time taken to complete our experimental tasks using
a textual security incident report and a textual report with a graphical overview are not significantly
different.” Hypothesis H3 is not supported. One interpretation of these results is that significant time
is required to understand security incidents, irrespective of whether they are presented in graphical or
textual format. However, this would require further empirical support to determine whether or not other
graphical notations might lead to significant differences in the time taken to understand security incident
reports. It is also important for further work to consider the learning effects that might be expected
through repeated use of the graphical maps.
The results for Task Load Index (TLX)
We used NASA’s Task Load Index [29] to assess workload using a post-evaluation questionnaire. The t-
test results show a significant difference (P = 0.047 < 0.05) in the first dimension of the task load index
regarding “how mentally demanding was the whole task”. With a mean value of task load, 12.75 versus
15.50, participants expressed a lower subjective level of workload in terms of “mentally demand”when
using the G.S.T. The results for the other four dimensions of the Task Load Index are not significantly
different. However, a more sustained analysis is required to replicate these findings across a wider range
of workload measures and with a larger sample of potential users.
Subjective feedback
In Group A, approximately half of the participants expressed some difficulty in understanding the text
based Security Incident Report. Half of the participants reported that they have no difficulty in
completing task 1 of Group A: identifying security elements from the security incident report with the
help of the G.S.T. Group B reported a slightly higher level of understanding of the Security Incident
Report. However, less than half of the participants suggested that they have no difficulty in completing
task 1 of Group B: identifying lessons learned from the security incident report, and the rate is much
lower than that of Group A. These subjective findings are consistent with the quantitative results in the
quantitative analysis.
The participants’ answers to the open questions regarding the overall experience of using the graphical
overviews suggested that a longer training session might have helped them to better prepare for the
tasks. Several participants mentioned that they had experienced learning effects; their confidence in
answering the questions increased as they worked their way through the questions. This finding from
Group A reveals generally positive feedback for the G.S.T. Group B did not use the G.S.T. during
the experiment. They were asked to review the G.S.T. after the experiment and provide the feedback
by completing Questionnaire Section ‘Conclusions and future work’ designed for Group B. Almost
all of them suggested that they would have no difficulty in understanding the G.S.T. and agreed that the
G.S.T. can help them better comprehend existing security incident reports. Two thirds of the participants
reported their willingness to use the G.S.T. if they are requested to do a similar task in future. “It will
help to understand terminologies security elements easily, less confusing, very structured and don’t
have to waste time, most importantly very easy to understand with less information”. In summary, the
participants’ overall experience with the G.S.T. is positive, however, questions remain about the ability
of participants to apply the lessons from the report within their own organisation rather than answering
directed questions about the contents of a security report.
Validity analysis
Threats to validity [32] are factors other than the independent variables that can affect the dependent
variables.
Internal validity
Internal validity is concerned about the cause-effect relationships induced from the study. Maturity
effects, there is a threat that the participants would tend to be bored and performed worse towards the
end of the experiment session. However, we do not think that maturity effects will have undermined
the validity of our results. As mentioned previously, several participants reported that their confidence
in using the different reporting formats increased as they progressed through the tasks. Learning effect,
there was not a learning effect in this experiment as there was only one treatment. Testing effects, all
participants have studied the same material in the familiarisation tutorial session. Very few students
have experience with security incident analysis. There was not any cheating because the experiment
was on a one-to-one session. Instrument effects, the participants were given the same type of tasks and
the answers were evaluated by the same marking scheme. Evaluator bias was addressed through the use
of two independent security experts during the assessment phase. The group identifiers were removed
so that Rater A and B marked the answers without knowing whether or not the participants had access
to the G.S.T. diagram.
External validity
External validity is the possibility to generalise the results beyond the current experiment. We
addressed these concerns by selecting a broad cross section of participants including individuals with
diverse background to reflect the those of managers and technical staff who must cooperate to
implement the recommendations in security incident reports. The participants were undergraduate and
postgraduate students. Using students in such experiment is common for practical reasons when the
professionals are less available and expensive. However, the generalisation of the results to different
target groups needs to be carefully considered.
Extended study - evaluation using cognitive dimensions
The main empirical study has identified the benefits and difficulties using the G.S.T. However, it has
not systematically evaluated the usability of G.S.T. as graphical notations. The extended study further
explores the strength and weaknesses of the G.S.T. using Cognitive Dimensions framework [33].
Cognitive dimensions framework
Cognitive Dimensions framework provides a generic approach to measure various usability
characteristics of notations and their environments [33]. Previous research has argued the importance
of using Cognitive Dimensions to evaluate graphical notations [34] and this approach has been
assessed for validity and reliability by a number of other researchers [35-37]. There are fourteen
dimensions in the full framework and below provides an example of the Visibility dimension,
Example:
(Visibility) It is easy to see or find the various parts of the Generic Security Template while it is being
used?
A. Strongly disagree B. Disagree C. Neutral D. Agree E. Strongly agree
Explain what kind of things is difficult to see or find?
For our study, we did not ask about the creation or modification of the notation. Therefore we have
selected five dimensions, which include Visibility, Diffuseness, Hard Mental Operation, Closeness of
Mapping, and Role Expressiveness. The evaluation questionnaire was based on the Cognitive
Dimensions of Notations Usability Framework.
Participants
The extended study is a follow-up study of the main empirical study. We interviewed the twelve
participants in Group A. They already had experience using the G.S.T. Each individual contact lasted
for approximately 20 minutes. The use of the Cognitive Dimensions aimed to identify the strengths and
weakness of the G.S.T., for example, any strength that the user is in favour of, any weakness that
affects usability, any opportunity for further improvements.
Results
CD-Visibility Dimension. Ten out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that “It is
easy to see or find the various parts of the G.S.T. while it is being used”. One participant disagreed and
argued about the visibility of the goal structure. The comment was “might be difficult to differentiate
between goals and sub goals”. The suggestions were “use of colour may help visual interpretation” and
“introduction of colours to identify the different levels/layers”.
CD-Diffuseness Dimension. Eleven out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed that
“the G.S.T. lets you say what you want reasonably brief”. There was one participant against it and the
reason was “too many words”. Too much information will undermine the effectiveness of the graphical
presentation, while too little information will make it difficult to understand. Future work should focus
on identifying an appropriate level of abstraction of the G.S.T.
CD-Hard Mental Operation Dimension. Six out of twelve of the participants disagreed that “There
seem some things especially complex or difficult to understand in your head while using the G.S.T.”.
Two out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed and stated this was caused by “too many
words within one notation”. They suggested to “separate recommendation into different or individual
circles”.
CD-Closeness of Mapping Dimension. Nine out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed
that “the G.S.T. describes the problem accurately and completely for the security incident stated in the
textual document”. There was one participant against it and the feedback was “the case is not generic
enough”, this is consistent with the comments on CD-Hard Mental Operation Dimension “with many
words”. The participants also argue about separation of the recommendation notations, “it’s in some
cases hard to separate the individual solutions in one bottom node into separate issues”, which had some
overlap with the finding in the CD-Hard Mental Operation Dimension.
CD-Role Expressiveness Dimension. Seven out of twelve of the participants agreed or strongly agreed
that “while reading the G.S.T., it is easy to tell what each part is for in the overall scheme”. One
participant disagreed with it. The feedback was “might be hard to see whether the user wants to work
on the high or low level of the hierarchy”. They suggested that “could use multiple cases” for different
target groups with interest towards different level of information. This is consistent with the finding in
an industiral evaluation of the G.S.T. They require a multi-view feature to meet the needs of different
target groups including security managers, engineers and healthcare professionals [38].
Discussion
Table 16 summarises the suggested improvements identified during the evaluation of the G.S.T. using
Cognitive Dimensions. One of the key questions for future work is to determine an appropriate level of
abstraction for G.S.T. Too much information might affect the readers’ motivation, and ability to analyse
the causes of a previous incident. There may also be problems in navigating and interpreting the
resulting graphical structures. While too little information will make it difficult to understand why an
incident occurred and may provide insufficient contextual information to focus future interventions.
There are some existing works on model abstraction. For example, Polyvyanyy proposed an
abstraction slider to allows user control of the model abstraction level [39]. Smirnov presented
abstraction approach, addressing specific features of BPMN [40]. Future work can focus on model
abstraction as well as business intelligence [41-43] to generate lessons learned with a desirable level of
details. However, questions remain on how to customise the G.S.T. to fit into the needs of particular
healthcare organisations.
Table 16 Improvement suggestions for the G.S.T.
Improvements Dimentions Comments
Use of Color CD-Visibility ... use of color may help visual interpretation;
... introduction of colors to identify the
different levels/layers....
Level of abstraction CD-Diffuseness ...too many words...; ...too many words within
one notation...; ...the template is not generic
enough...
Separation of notations CD-Closeness of Mapping;
CD-Hard Mental Operation
... separate recommendation into different or
individual circles; ... the recommendation part
needs to be simplified or separate individually
[under suitable category]; ... it is in some cases
hard to separate the individual solutions in one
bottom node into separate issues...
Multi-view CD-Role Expressiveness ... could use multiple templates; ... might be
hard to see whether the user wants to work on
the high or low level of the hierarchy...
Conclusions and future work
The graphical G.S.T. captures the lessons learned from the security incidents and reasons about the
information system security by attaching them to the security objectives of the organisation. It provides
a way to communicate the information to different parties on how the remedial actions are taken in
compliance with the organisational objectives as ways of avoiding future violations, hence increases
their confidence and trust of organisations’ information security management systems [3]. In this paper,
we have presented the results derived from an initial study into the use of Generic Security Template
to represent and reason about the recommendations made in a report of a data confidentiality breach
involving the US Veterans’ Affairs Administration. We were able to show significant benefits from
the use of a graphical technique in answering a number of comprehension questions when compared
to the more conventional use of text-based incident reports. However, we could not demonstrate any
significant benefits in terms of the time taken to complete our experimental tasks.
A list of suggestion to improve the Generic Security Template had been identified using the Cognitive
Dimensions and from the subjective feedback. There are recommendations regarding the visibility of the
Generic Security Template, to add colour to the Generic Security Template to improve the visualisation,
and decomposition of the lessons learned notation to decompose the complex lessons learned notation
that contains more than one learning points and the multi-view design for different target users. We will
consider those recommendations in the future design of the Generic Security Template. In particular the
use of students is a limitation, healthcare security professionals need to be involved in future validation.
Our work yields important insights into the difficulties that engineers face when trying to understand
the implications that previous security incident reports have for their own organisations. There have
been numerous empirical studies to evaluate the usability of graphical notations, including
Entity-Relationship diagrams [44], UML [45,46] etc. However, as far as we are aware, there have been
no previous studies to assess the strengths and weaknesses of graphical notations to help transfer the
lessons learned from previous security incidents. These studies are urgently needed as both the Obama
administration and the European Commission have recently published proposals to support the
mandatory reporting of security incidents across national critical infrastructures, including healthcare.
This provides the foundation for future work to further evaluate this approach with people working in
healthcare industry.
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